off boys in the but what to recommend and then went to bed wake, about the sinking of the lusitania. then kingdom of ice which harry reid recommended. i just wrapping up a trip it novel, anthony, the narrow road to the deep north which is another novel and the sixth extinction. so those are the last two i'm reading right now. >> booktv wants to know what you are reading this summer. tweet us your answer @booktv or post on a facebook page, facebook.com/booktv. >> here's a look at some books that are being published this week.
>> the challenge was always to get a group of people trained and outfitted correctly to the right place at the right time, and you needed masked because each person to do much power. you had to be organized and disciplined and change of command because it had to be predictable. if you said this yet to be able to predict what the effects would be. we went on to that and we took it through first world war, second world war, incredibly mechanical worst in many ways, but if you are big enough and you are efficient enough you could win because he built a
bigger machine, and more awesome machine, you crush your enemy. probably the apathy of what that was the first goal for. it was clear saddam hussein put his army on a golf te the angels just line up on because every strength we had deployed to. which was extraordinary. we got this feeling that we had advanced technology that they did have, global positioning systems, precision strike weapons, night vision, unmanned aerial vehicles. we have the psychological overmatch and we have the organizational overmatch a better trained, better organize, we are more efficient. sounds pretty good. we go into iraq in the fall of, or in the spring of 2003, and that worked. it worked beautifully. but then within about six weeks you start to see the situation in iraq deteriorate for lots of reasons. then in the early fall, late
summer, early fall you start to see al-qaeda their enrichment of the got a problem with saddam hussein and his followers but it wasn't. it was the arrival of al-qaeda under a guy named al zarqawi who leveled frustrations to create a tears of/insurgency. put those two things together and chatted this thing go. normally that would be less than a match for the kinds of forces we had come to do with the technology and whatnot. in the fall i took over joint special operations command which have this wonderful collection as chris described of america's most elite counterterrorism force a just extraordinary, but. we start doing operations ever doing operations and doing very well. every thing we do is exquisitely executed and most of them are for successful. but the situation keeps getting worse. so we doing everything we've been taught to doing it better than ever and the situation continues to deteriorate.
against an enemy al-qaeda in iraq which on the face is not that good. they are not particularly well-trained. if you think about the narrative, the political narrative that they push, it's kind of absurd. it's nihilism and the behavior was aboard what they're getting better and better and so as we study the problem what we found is, and i don't think my design, i think was by luck, they intersected with a change in the world at a change in the world driven by two big factors. one, interdependence and the other was speaker we all know things are getting faster but we're not quite sure completely what that means for all of us every day. but interdependence, things are connected in ways that they never have before. computer supply chains, think of your connectivity for your banking, your information, everything. in just a very simple way al-qaeda would put off a car bomb in baghdad, for example, it would be three vehicles, a lead
vehicle, a car bomb vehicle driven by the lucky car bomber, then there was a third vehicle whose primary role was to film it. and within minutes they would upload that to the internet and pass it to pakistan would be produced, pretty professionally, pass it back in, be on the internet and suddenly people who were not there to hear, were not there to see the carnage, felt it. they felt it in bothell, they felt it in north africa. and young people started to get, hey, this is something i want to be a part of, look what they are doing. so the interdependence of the action start to be just incredible. so an entity that had this network like association but not a traditional hierarchy, we kept looking for, kept trying to say it was mr. big and we'l will tae mountain will solve this problem. that's not what they work and that's not what isis is.